Richardson slipped on a wet sidewalk and sued Piggly for negligence. She won at the magistrate court, but, the circuit court reversed. The panel affirmed. It held that viewed in the light most favorable to Richardson, her evidence showed that the sidewalk was wet from rain, she knew it was wet from rain and the sidewalk was outside the store. Thus, her evidence failed a as matter of law to demonstrate negligence.
MicroClean licensed air purifiers to EnviroFix. EnviroFix complained about performance issues and declared the licensing agreement void. MicroClean sued for breach of contract and EnviroFix countersued. The master ruled EnviroFix properly terminated the agreement, MicroClean had breached the agreement’s repair provisions and allowed an offset of damages using a security deposit. The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. It held that the declaration by EnviroFix was inadequate to terminate the licensing agreement as it did not explicitly state it was giving the required 60 days’ notice. It also held that agreement did not limit damages to the amount of the security deposit. However, the panel affirmed the failure to repair award as supported by the evidence. The case was remanded for further fact finding by the master as to affirmative defenses and damages.
AnMed required all employees to get a flu shot. One employee refused based on her belief that a flu shot had triggered a fatal genetic disorder in her daughter. AnMed fired the employee and opposed unemployment benefits arguing the employee was fired for cause. Department ultimately ruled the termination was not for cause and the administrative law court affirmed. The panel affirmed. It first held that AnMed’s requirement of a flu shot was reasonable and the administrative law courts ruling tot eh contrary was reversed. However, given the employee’s reasonable beliefs about her daughter’s death, substantial evidence supported Department’s conclusion that employee acted reasonably in the circumstances and was therefore not fired for cause.
Buchanan bought cars from Ritter through an agent. The agent engaged in check kiting resulting in losses for several car dealerships and wholesalers. The special referee ruled that the agent bound Buchanan to buy 20 cars from Ritter and Ritter was not paid for these cars. It rejected Ritter’s claim under the South Carolina Motor Vehicle Dealer’s Act did not apply. The panel affirmed. It held the evidence supported a finding that the agent could and did bind Buchanan and that there was no evidence the agent was acting for any other entity as to the 20 cars in question. The panel held that the forensic accounting evince was sufficient to prove damages and that comparative negligence does not apply in contract cases. It finally held that because the business transactions occurred in Florida and the 20 cars were all in Florida at the relevant time, the Dealer’s act did not apply.